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Introduction 
This article argues that the proposed U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation has significant merit, 
promising tangible energy, economic, and security benefits to India, the United States and the 
wider international community. India’s acute energy needs and the upsides of the deal are greater 
than is generally appreciated. And while possible proliferation downsides exist, they have been 
exaggerated. The article lays out the argument in four parts. First, it examines India’s energy 
situation and its relationship to the Indian economy. Second, it looks at India’s options for 
improving its energy outlook and the role of nuclear energy among those options. Next, it 
addresses proliferation concerns; and, finally, it ends with a discussion of regional security 
considerations, especially with respect to a possible arms race with China.  
In the summer of 2005, the U.S. and Indian governments publicly announced plans for a deal to 
cooperate on civilian nuclear power production. Some observers quickly condemned the deal on 
the basis that such cooperation would be bad for global nonproliferation efforts. Similar criticism 
eight months later, following the joint U.S.-Indian announcement of an agreement on the 
substance of the deal, left many Americans with the impression the administration had decided to 
accept a bad deal.  
In reality, the deal has significant merit, promising tangible energy, economic and security 
benefits to India, the U.S. and the wider international community. India’s acute energy needs and 
the upsides of the deal are greater than is generally appreciated. And while possible proliferation 
downsides exist, they have been exaggerated. The proposed deal presents an opportunity to 
strengthen U.S.-India ties in a way that is good for the U.S., India and others.  
I. 
There is a very strong correlation between energy consumption and both economic growth and 
human development. This correlation once led the World Bank to focus approximately a quarter 
of all development financing on programs to improve energy services.[1] Currently rural areas of 
India are the least served by electricity, and over 40 percent of households nationwide lack 
electric services. With 60 percent of India’s 1.1 billion people engaged in agriculture, India could 
vastly improve its productivity and trade in farm goods by providing electricity to rural areas for 
food processing and refrigeration. Indians, especially rural farmers, operate hundreds of 
thousands of small diesel generators to meet their electricity needs, adding to the global demand 
for oil.[2] Thus, greater electric generating capacity is not just a key to Indian development, it 
would also marginally curb the nation’s growing demand for oil.  
For developing countries, the growth required in electric power production has historically 
exceeded GDP growth-rates, such that a country seeking to sustain a 10 percent growth in 
GDP—as India’s leaders desire—would need a 15 percent growth in electric generating capacity. 
Though recent trends suggest India’s GDP growth-rate can outpace its growth in electricity 
output[3], even a 7.5 percent growth rate in electricity—half the historically indicated rate—would 
mean India must double its electricity from about 125 gigawatts today to over 250 gigawatts by 
2016.[4]  
In the early 1990s, India began electricity reforms that have unevenly advanced the country’s 
effectiveness and efficiency in providing electricity to its 1.1 billion people.[5] Still, India’s 
unreliable electric power grid inflicts an average of 17 major disruptions per month on Indian 
manufacturers, leading many factory owners to build their own electric generating facilities.[6] 
Perhaps as much as one-fifth of all electric power generated in India comes from such off-grid or 
“captive” generation, and many of these generators—especially smaller ones—use diesel fuel.[7]  
The Indian government has recognized the need to improve its electric power sector and 
committed itself to greater energy independence and reliability. Indeed, all five of the 
government’s top priorities to spur growth—improved water services, better energy supply, better 
education, building India’s infrastructure, and employing more of the country’s people—depend 
heavily on improving India’s energy situation and particularly its electric services.[8]  
Even with its hobbled electric services, the Indian economy has expanded at an average of about 
6 percent real growth for over a decade. With former Finance Minister and economist Manmohan 
Singh as Prime Minister, India continues to institute business, economic and educational reforms, 
leaving India poised to realize even greater growth in the years ahead.[9] Despite India’s powerful 
labor unions, its resilient communist party, and the dismal example of Enron’s Dabhol power 
project, the country’s desperate need for electricity and its market-oriented reforms are attracting 
the attention of would-be suppliers of electric power plants. Such progress bodes well for the 
United States, and for the people of India. Trade between the two countries grew to over 26 
billion dollars in 2005, more than double the figure from 2000. American-based multinational 
corporations have built a thriving services sector in India—an arrangement that benefits America 
and India alike by boosting U.S. exports to India and adding jobs there. With continued economic 
growth, India’s middle class of 300 million consumers will prosper, stoking global trade.  
While India’s leaders hope to boost the country’s economic growth rate to 10 percent, the 
shortage of reliable and affordable energy acts as a brake on growth.[10] The growing gap 
between electricity supply and demand, as well as the effects that gap has on India’s economy, 
highlights the adage that, “No energy is as costly as no energy,”—an observation attributed to the 
late Homni Bhabha, a pioneer of India’s civilian nuclear power program.[11]  
II. 
In order to meet its enormous energy needs, India is counting on developments in all forms of 
electric power generation, including nuclear power. While hydropower figures prominently in 
India’s plan—with some high-end projections that India will grow from about 15 gigawatts today to 
over 80 gigawatts of capacity by 2020[12]—India’s ability to expand hydroelectric power is limited 
in part by overpopulation and the inability to relocate people who would be displaced by the water 
backed up behind new dams.[13] Even if India can achieve such an ambitious expansion of its 
hydropower production, it will still need other sources of electric power. Non-hydropower 
renewable energy supplies, such a solar and wind, provide a mere three-tenths of one percent of 
India’s electricity generation—well under half of a megawatt of capacity, or the equivalent of a 
single medium-sized U.S. power plant. Yet India’s president, Abdul Kalam, forecasts 100 
gigawatts of non-hydropower renewable energy by 2020. According to Kalam, much of this 
energy will come from solar power, including small-scale, distributed solar power generation that 
could benefit India’s farmers. These soaring projections are, however, based on a presumed 
technological breakthrough that will significantly reduce costs while delivering a three-fold 
increase in the efficiency of solar cells.[14] Clearly, India’s president is counting on dramatic and 
improbable increases in the country’s capacity to generate electricity from hydro-power and other 
renewable sources, and India should look to other energy options.  
With about 17 percent of the world’s population, India is endowed with a paltry portion of the 
world’s oil and gas reserves, amounting to less than one percent of the known global total.[15] 
Absent improvements in the reliability of electricity services, Indian manufacturers and individual 
households are likely to continue using off-grid or “captive” generation that depends mostly on 
petroleum and natural gas to produce electricity. Such practices modestly heighten competition in 
today’s tight oil and gas markets, adding slight upward pressure on prices. India’s domestic gas 
production supplies only about half of the amount the country consumes, and the rapid growth in 
gas imports slowed dramatically in 2006 due to increased natural gas prices and uncertainty over 
Iranian liquid natural gas (LNG) and pipeline projects. In summary, India will continue its path of 
growing dependence on imported oil and gas, some of which will be used to produce electricity, 
but neither oil nor gas is a viable alternative for meeting India’s burgeoning electricity needs.  
While India lacks abundant indigenous supplies of oil and gas, it is loaded with coal, and 70 
percent of the coal mined in India goes into producing electricity. India ranks fourth in the world in 
terms of coal reserves, and is the world’s third largest coal producer behind the U.S. and 
China.[16] But, Indian coal is of poor quality, it is malpositioned, and approximately 90 percent of 
it is mined by India’s inefficient state-owned Coal India Ltd (CIL).[17] India’s coal deposits are 
concentrated in the east of the country, requiring transport on India’s overstressed rail system. 
Moreover, with 35 percent ash and low energy-content, India has already resorted to importing 
cheaper, higher-quality coal, adding to congestion at its ports.[18] Without “clean-coal” technology, 
an increased use of coal would add to India’s already significant problems with pollution. While 
coal will continue to dominate as a fuel for India’s electric power sector, the country’s leaders are 
anxious to shift to cleaner means of generating electricity.  
Today, nuclear energy accounts for just three percent of India’s electric power generating 
capacity, compared to a world-wide average of about 16 percent.[19] The 14 nuclear power 
plants India agreed to put under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
represent approximately 3,000 megawatts or 3 gigawatts of generating capacity. By 2020, India 
plans to add another 12-16 gigawatts of nuclear generating capacity to its power grid—
quintupling its current nuclear capacity.[20] The large percentage in growth reflects the relatively 
small role nuclear power plays in India today, so that even by 2020, nuclear power will contribute 
only about seven percent of India’s total generating capacity. However, it seems feasible nuclear 
power could play an even bigger role in India’s future than is currently envisioned, given the 
technical and economic hurdles associated with other forms of energy.  
Some of the same factors affecting India, help to explain why many of the 30 countries operating 
nuclear power plants today may be on the verge of a renaissance in nuclear energy. The U.S. is 
by far the biggest producer of nuclear energy, with 103 nuclear power plants, representing one-
quarter of the world total, and over 27 percent of the global nuclear generating capacity. Soaring 
natural gas prices have dramatically curbed the boom in new gas-fired power plants, contributing 
to extensions of nuclear plant licenses in the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Germany. China, 
with just nine nuclear power plants today, intends to build thirty new nuclear plants by 2020. In 
early 2006, Germany reversed a political decision to phase out nuclear power, and the U.S. 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided incentives for six new U.S. nuclear power plants.  
Proponents of nuclear power are predicting many more new nuclear plants are likely to be built in 
the U.S. as new designs become standardized, thus easier for the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to approve. Moreover, the NRC is moving toward streamlined approval and 
licensing procedures that reduce the time needed and the risks to utilities wishing to build new 
plants. Finally, under the U.S. administration’s new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), 
America is exploring the possibility of a proliferation-resistant technique that would extract more 
energy from nuclear fuels and overcome some of the challenges of dealing with nuclear waste. 
The 250 million dollars requested by the Department of Energy for GNEP in the 2007 budget was 
in addition to 632.7 million dollars for other nuclear energy initiatives, including over 30 million for 
research and development of a new generation of nuclear reactors.  
In short, nuclear energy is making a comeback globally, and it represents a modest but important 
component of India’s plan for expanding electric power production. Absent dramatic growth and 
improvement in electricity services, India is unlikely to sustain its current rate of economic growth, 
much less achieve the 10 percent GDP growth rate sought by the country’s leaders.  
III. 
Critics of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation deal have exaggerated the impact it is likely to have 
on India’s nuclear weapons program, global nonproliferation regimes, and the strategic balance in 
the region. They tend to overestimate the influence the U.S. has in inhibiting India’s nuclear 
program, and they generally fail to acknowledge the potential utility of the deal for strengthening 
nonproliferation efforts. By opposing the deal on proliferation grounds, the critics implicitly 
advocate reinforcing failed policies of the past that, ironically, militate against outside influence 
and monitoring of India’s nuclear facilities, thereby undermining nonproliferation goals.  
Indeed, there was some early and hearty approval for the prospect of U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation. Mohamed El Baradei, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
immediately embraced the proposed cooperation, stating: “It would also bring India closer as an 
important partner in the non-proliferation regime…It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing 
efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen 
nuclear safety.”[21] In addition, key members of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 
such as France, Russia and the United Kingdom, quickly voiced support for the U.S. deal with 
India. However, it should be noted that Canada and China, both NSG members, have been less 
enamored with it.  
Within three weeks of the March 2006 announcement of the deal, Russia agreed to supply 
uranium to refuel two reactors at India’s Tarapur nuclear site. Interestingly, low-enriched uranium 
for Tarapur’s reactors has been supplied by NSG member states since those reactors came on 
line in 1969.[22] If the U.S. fails to go ahead with the deal, it seems certain that other NSG 
countries will seek to supplant the U.S. in cooperating with India. America would hardly be in a 
position to object to the same sort of cooperation that it had first proposed.  
But what is one to make of the claim that the deal threatens to destroy the global regimes for 
blocking proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 
U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act were designed to prevent proliferation by denying access to 
nuclear technology and nuclear materials for states that refused to sign the NPT. To bolster 
controls on nuclear technology and materials, the U.S. led the establishment of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group in the mid-1970s. Though imperfect, the NPT and NSG provided a workable 
framework for international cooperation to limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology. Still, it 
would be a mistake to ascribe too much credit to the existing international nuclear proliferation 
controls. Even if one leaves aside cases such as Argentina, Brazil, Libya, and South Africa, which 
have renounced their nascent nuclear weapons programs, there have been some glaring failures 
in the nonproliferation regimes’ ability to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Israel and Pakistan, 
neither of which signed the NPT, where assisted in acquiring nuclear weapons technology by 
signatories to the NPT, France and China, respectively. Iran and North Korea, both signatories to 
the treaty, have used nuclear technology, equipment and fuel, gained from civilian nuclear power 
programs, to develop nuclear weapons programs. Whatever the merits of the existing nuclear 
nonproliferation regimes, they have failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and should 
hardly be viewed as immutable, eternally relevant bars to proliferation.  
India is unique in that it did not sign the NPT and has developed its own nuclear weapons 
program. Though India reneged on its promise of fifty years ago not to use Canadian-supplied 
reactors and U.S.-supplied heavy-water to develop nuclear weapons, it never signed and 
therefore has not violated the NPT. Because India was cutoff from external technological 
assistance after conducting its first nuclear explosion in 1974, it has developed its own 
indigenous nuclear technology for the past 30 years. Today, India has a good understanding of 
the nuclear fuel cycle and claims to be pioneering techniques for using thorium as fuel; it has 
produced an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and it has built up its civilian nuclear power program. 
Certainly, India would like to gain easier access to enriched uranium, but it has thus far been 
unwilling to accept limits on its nuclear weapons program to gain that access. Moreover, though 
India remained outside the NPT, the country has been widely credited with responsibly preventing 
the spread of its own nuclear technology, including withholding nuclear weapons technology from 
Libya and Iran, despite being tempted with lucrative energy deals.[23] The current proposal for 
U.S.-India nuclear cooperation, though not a treaty, would bind India through international 
agreement to continue its responsible nonproliferation policies.  
Regardless of what the U.S. decides to do, India is likely to advance its nuclear power program 
and, if it so chooses, its nuclear weapons program, too. While the NPT and NSG remain 
important tools for international cooperation, their spotty track record and questionable relevance 
in the case of India—make it difficult to argue convincingly that stubbornly adhering to old policy 
strictures is somehow preferable to adopting new ones that are consistent with the goals of the 
nonproliferation regimes.  
If the U.S. and India go ahead with cooperation on nuclear power, it will increase the potential for 
the transfer of nuclear expertise to India’s nuclear weapons program. The leaders in New Delhi 
can promote such transfer or they can work to limit it. Therefore, the U.S. ought to structure its 
cooperation on nuclear power to ensure present and future Indian administrations cannot easily 
divert U.S. assistance to India’s nuclear weapons program. Continued cooperation could be 
made contingent on U.S. presidential certification to Congress that India is not effecting such 
transfers. If adding contingencies for presidential certification would spoil the deal, as some 
experts believe,[24] then perhaps barriers to technology transfers can be built into the technology 
used for producing power, that is, proliferation resistant technology. In addition to limiting the 
transfer of expertise to India’s weapons program, the U.S. could use whatever leverage it has to 
move India to place limits on its production of fissile material. Even a temporary limit, subject to 
future review and renewal, would be a step in the right direction. However, history suggests that 
India will not commit to limitations on its nuclear weapons program and it is probably too late to 
add new provisions along these lines.  
Certainly India has consistently prioritized its security interests, as it perceives them, above 
whatever benefits it might have accrued by joining the NPT. Over the past thirty years, it has paid 
a price for failing to join the NPT in 1968, and for subsequently testing nuclear explosives in 1974 
and 1998. The U.S. has also paid a price in less than warm relations with India, but that price was 
smaller and more affordable when it was first imposed. Now that India has established a viable 
nuclear deterrent, further restrictions on nuclear cooperation will adversely affect India’s civilian 
energy program and economic progress, more than they will affect its nuclear weapons programs. 
In contrast to what critics of the deal say, U.S.-India nuclear cooperation appears to offer a viable 
way forward that is, on balance, beneficial to international nonproliferation goals.  
IV. 
For some observers, U.S. overtures to India are seen as an attempt to balance against or to 
contain China. Furthermore, nonproliferation groups worry that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation will 
allow India to use imported nuclear fuel for its power reactors, while husbanding its domestic 
supply of uranium for its weapons program. Either or both of these conditions—growing U.S.-
India ties and the possible expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal—it is feared, could lead to an 
arms race between China and India. The following paragraphs argue that although India probably 
intends to continue producing fissile material, it does not necessarily follow that that would upset 
the strategic calculations of China or the military balance in the region. Moreover, stronger U.S.-
India ties could be a stabilizing force for South Asia and need not come at the expense of others.  
India, by all accounts, has adopted a “force-in-being” posture for its nuclear weapons, whereby 
warheads are not kept in a ready status but instead remain disassembled and separated from 
their delivery systems. Like China, India has foresworn the first use of nuclear weapons and its 
nuclear doctrine is ostensibly based on minimal, credible deterrence, in which nuclear weapons 
would be used only in retaliation. At the same time, the Chinese have reportedly been 
modernizing and building up their nuclear weapons capabilities for at least a decade. China’s 
strategic force modernization and buildup began long before the warming of U.S.-India relations. 
So, it would seem that China and India are well embarked on programs to meet their own 
perceived security needs, including modernization of their respective nuclear forces. It is unclear, 
therefore, why the Chinese leadership would recalibrate its nuclear force structure needs based 
on the U.S.-India nuclear deal—a deal that parallels U.S.-China nuclear energy cooperation that 
began in the late 1990s.  
Though Beijing is unlikely to be moved by the U.S.-India nuclear power deal, China’s leadership 
might well be wary of U.S.-India cooperation in the conventional military arena. American naval, 
air, and ground forces have, in recent years, engaged increasingly in joint military exercises with 
their Indian counterparts. Moreover since early 2005, the U.S. has been willing to sell Patriot 
Missiles and F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft to India. With the vast bulk of China’s fuel and other 
natural resources flowing from the Persian Gulf and Africa, through the Indian Ocean and the 
Straits of Malacca, China’s military planners are undoubtedly concerned already about the 
security of their country’s trade and energy supplies routes—especially given China’s limited 
naval capabilities. Indeed, China’s ongoing naval expansion and modernization is motivated no 
doubt in large measure by Beijing’s perceived vulnerability to a blockade or embargo. As an 
antidote to Chinese concerns, India and the U.S. should seek to continue strengthening their ties 
with China. Just as the U.S. has in recent years simultaneously strengthened its relationships 
with both Pakistan and India, relationships among China, India and the U.S. should not be seen 
as a zero-sum equation.  
In strengthening ties to China, the U.S. and India could begin cooperating as energy consumers. 
China is a major trading partner of both the U.S. and India, and all three countries share concerns 
for their own ballooning energy appetites and the apparent inability of world oil and gas suppliers 
to keep pace. In a global oil market, cooperation, rather than competition, would seem the wiser 
course. Though not yet as fungible as oil, natural gas appears to be on a similar trajectory to oil’s 
in the 1970s—with LNG trade paralleling earlier market developments in oil trading. Given the 
potential for common interests as energy consumers, some experts have suggested India and 
China be encouraged to form cooperative arrangements with the International Energy Agency 
and that the two rapidly developing Asian powers should establish strategic petroleum reserves—
just as countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) did to 
protect themselves against disruptions in oil markets in the 1970s.[25]  
China’s energy situation has been similar to India’s in many respects. Though it took more than a 
decade to win Congressional approval, by the end of the 1990s the U.S. finally began 
cooperating with China on nuclear energy. Since then, U.S.-China trade in nuclear power 
technology and equipment has risen to become the second fastest growing export item from the 
U.S. to China.[26] Like India, China’s electric services are characterized by inadequate capacity 
and blackouts. Part of the global surge in oil prices in 2004, was due to increased Chinese 
demand, including significant amounts of fuel needed for diesel generators to compensate for the 
country’s sagging electric services. Like India, China is rich in coal and faces challenges with air 
pollution. Like India, China is pursuing multiple paths toward improving its energy situation, with 
hydroelectric, renewable power, and nuclear power. As China’s leaders aggressively attempt to 
lock up oil and gas supplies around the globe, they should be quick to recognize that advances in 
Indian nuclear power would reduce—if only modestly—competition for imported fossil fuels.  
As China and India strive to meet their respective energy and security needs, there seems little 
likelihood that U.S.-India nuclear cooperation will somehow spark a nuclear arms race. To the 
extent India and China continue to develop nuclear arms, it will not be caused by U.S.-India 
cooperation on civilian nuclear power. To the extent there is an arms race in the region, it is likely 
to be a conventional one, stemming from hedging strategies by all parties concerned and the 
classic security dilemma induced by such hedging. Succinctly, nuclear arms developments and 
conventional arms racing in the region should be seen as relatively independent of U.S.-India 
cooperation on civilian nuclear power.  
A more likely concern than a China-India nuclear arms race is the potential for Pakistan to 
demand nuclear cooperation that mirrors the deal India gets with the U.S. Pakistan, regrettably, 
suffers from several disadvantages compared to India, making any nuclear cooperation with 
Pakistan unlikely in the foreseeable future. First, Pakistan is considerably less stable, ruled as it is 
by General Musharraf who took power in a coup from a democratically elected government and 
who has been the target of at least four assassination attempts. Second, the reckless proliferation 
activities of A.Q. Kahn—the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and still a hero inside 
Pakistan—stand in stark contrast to the perception of India as being responsible in resisting 
proliferation.[27] Pakistan’s historic ties to Islamic extremist groups and lingering suspicions that 
such ties still exist, should give pause to any would-be supplier of nuclear arms technology. 
Finally, Pakistan does not enjoy the same robust command of nuclear science and technology as 
India, thus the potential spillover from Pakistan’s civilian power sector to its weapons program 
would appear to be much greater than in the case of India. The U.S. and other NSG countries 
should continue to pursue closer ties with Pakistan and support its development, but not through 
nuclear cooperation.  
In summary, absent a dramatic change in India’s nuclear weapons posture, U.S.-India 
cooperation on civilian nuclear power is unlikely to significantly alter the strategic calculus or 
nuclear force structure of China or Pakistan.  
V. 
Stopping nuclear proliferation remains a vital goal for the United States, but arguments about the 
potential harm the U.S.-India nuclear power deal would do to nonproliferation regimes have been 
exaggerated. On balance, the deal should help strengthen global nonproliferation efforts by 
bringing India into the fold—at least partially, by bringing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology 
to India, and by codifying in international agreements the responsible policies India has taken 
unilaterally—but could just as easily reverse unilaterally.  
India’s energy needs are dire, and those needs will only be met through a variety of energy 
sources, including nuclear power. The sooner India begins adding nuclear generating capacity, 
the better for curbing India’s growing oil and gas appetite and the less India will have to rely on 
coal. While the nuclear cooperation deal between India and the U.S. does not fit neatly into the 
NPT or the existing U.S. Atomic Energy Act, it does provide a viable way forward. Not only would 
the deal advance the two countries’ economic and security interests, it promises to help unlock 
India’s potential as a vast market for exports, thereby benefiting the global economy. The ultimate 
outcome of the deal will help set the course for the U.S. relationship with a rising India. As 
statements from President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice make clear, the 
question is not whether India will grow, the question is what sort of relationship the U.S. would 
like to have with a growing India.[28] Viewed in that light, roadblocks to U.S. cooperation with 
India could end up hurting America’s interests more than India’s.  
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